**CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT**

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UNITED KINGDOM

Working Paper on the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty

The United Kingdom Delegation consider that priority in the field of nuclear arms control and disarmament should be given to a ban on underground tests of nuclear weapons; in their view the real danger of vertical proliferation lies in the development of more sophisticated weapons systems which a comprehensive test ban treaty would prevent. The United Kingdom Delegation favour the conclusion of a comprehensive test ban treaty at the earliest possible moment and as soon as terms that are generally acceptable can be agreed.

2. The principal avowed obstacle in the way of a comprehensive test ban treaty is the problem of on-site inspection. It may be noted, however, that since the early days of the negotiations on a comprehensive test ban treaty, the means of identifying incidents as earthquakes or explosions have been greatly improved and there is substantial agreement at the technical level on what can or cannot be identified. This is evidenced in the unanimously adopted summary of the report of the recent meetings of scientists and other experts to discuss the technical aspects of the control of an underground test ban under the auspices of the International Institute for Peace and Conflict Research in Stockholm (ENDC/230).

3. The United Kingdom Delegation understand fears that on-site inspection might present difficulties but recognise that below the identification threshold there can be no certainty whether a given event is an explosion or an earthquake. In these circumstances it is reasonable for parties to a comprehensive test ban treaty to ask for such verification to be provided as is possible, practicable and necessary to ensure that other parties are honouring their obligations. In order to dispel the fears of those who maintain that on-site inspection would present difficulties and to meet the needs of those who maintain that the possibility of on-site inspection is vital for the conclusion of an effective comprehensive test ban treaty, the United Kingdom

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Delegation suggest that consideration should be given to the establishment under such a treaty of a committee whose function it would be to consider evidence of possible infringement of the treaty. Such a committee would have the right to carry out on-site inspection but only if strong evidence were produced of an infringement of the treaty.

4. The United Kingdom Delegation's views on the composition of the committee are flexible. They seek first to gain acceptance of the principle of its establishment. But they suggest that it might be composed of representatives of the three nuclear weapon states parties to the treaty, representatives of three non-aligned countries, and a nominee of the United Nations Secretary-General or the Director-General of the International Atomic Energy Agency. It is suggested that apart from the United Nations or the International Atomic Energy Agency nominee the members of the committee might be government representatives, assisted by scientific advisers, rather than themselves scientists. The right of on-site inspection would only be exercised if the committee agreed by a majority of 5-2 that a prima facie case had been made out. While the committee would have the ultimate right of on-site inspection, the procedure proposed is specifically designed to circumscribe this right in such a way as to ensure that it was not exercised irresponsibly or improperly.

5. As scientific knowledge and the means of detection and identification develop, the need for and the probability of on-site inspection would diminish. No country adhering to the treaty would be submitting to any certain or automatic on-site inspection. But the possibility that inspection might take place would play a very large part in establishing confidence in the effectiveness of the treaty.

6. While the United Kingdom Delegation are in favour of the conclusion of an effective test ban treaty at the earliest possible moment they have also been considering the possibility that the implementation of the comprehensive test ban might be made a phased operation by starting with an agreed annual quota of underground test explosions. This proposal is based on recognition of the fact that it may not be possible to get agreement now to stop all nuclear weapons testing over night in isolation from other measures of disarmament. The object of the quota proposal is to put an increasingly powerful brake on the development of new nuclear weapon systems with a view to bringing this dangerous process to a complete halt

within a fixed time period. The treaty might provide for quotas on a descending scale over a period of four or five years ending with a nil quota after which further tests would be banned absolutely. Alternatively, the quotas might not be written into the treaty but fixed annually, possibly by a committee of the kind which has been suggested above. Supervision of the quota arrangements would be exercised by the same mechanism as proposed above for the treaty itself.

7. It will also be necessary under a comprehensive test ban treaty to provide for the carrying out of operational or experimental nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes. The United Kingdom Delegation consider that such a requirement could be accommodated within the system proposed. There may well be a need for international supervision of peaceful nuclear explosions, in order to satisfy states party to the treaty and the international committee that the explosion in question was needed for its stated purpose. Peaceful nuclear explosions could also be accommodated within a quota system, either by treating them as part of the quota or as permitted exclusions from the treaty provided they conformed to internationally agreed arrangements for their conduct.

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UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS

Letter dated 20 August 1968 from the Representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to the Special Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the German Democratic Republic has transmitted to the delegation of the USSR in the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, whose Head is co-Chairman of the Committee, a Statement of the Government of the German Democratic Republic to the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, with the request to bring this Statement to the notice of all the States Members of the Committee. The German Democratic Republic was one of the first States to sign the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. The aforesaid Statement sets out the position of the German Democratic Republic on the problem of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and on other questions of disarmament.

I request you to arrange for my letter, to which is attached the Statement of the Government of the German Democratic Republic, to be circulated by the Secretariat of the Committee as an official document of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament.

(signed) A. ROSHCHIN

Representative of the USSR in the
Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament

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STATEMENT

of the Government of the German Democratic Republic
to the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament

I.

The Government of the German Democratic Republic welcomes the resumption of the negotiations of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament and congratulates the Committee on the successful conclusion of the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. It expresses the hope that in its future activities the Committee will soon achieve further positive results that could contribute to a relaxation of tension and the consolidation of peace.

The Government of the German Democratic Republic attaches exceedingly great importance to the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, which was drafted by the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament and approved by the twenty-second session of the United Nations General Assembly. Consistent implementation of that treaty will reduce the danger of a devastating world thermonuclear war and facilitate and speed up measures in regard to arms restriction and disarmament. It will thus at the same time help towards the establishment of a system of collective security in Europe and a reliable international order of peace.

Basing itself on this premise, the Government of the German Democratic Republic was one of the first to sign the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. At the same time the Council of State and the Government of the German Democratic Republic expressed the hope that the Government of the West German Federal Republic would likewise accede to the treaty. The West German Federal Republic, however, is delaying signing it, and in doing so it is obviously pursuing political and military aims.

The conclusion of the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, which explicitly provides for further negotiations on measures towards effective disarmament, has brought about new, favourable possibilities for the adoption of specific measures in this field. The proposals put forward by the Government of the USSR in its memorandum on some urgent measures for stopping the arms race and for disarmament correspond perfectly well to these possibilities. The Government of the German Democratic Republic, at its meeting on 17 July 1968, expressed its complete

agreement with the memorandum of the Government of the USSR and states also to the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament that it will steadfastly support the measures proposed therein towards arms restriction and disarmament, in particular nuclear disarmament. It holds the opinion that the implementation of this disarmament programme could free mankind from the nightmare of a thermonuclear war and expresses the hope that the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament will give due attention to those proposals.

II.

The Government of the German Democratic Republic considers it to be its most urgent national task and international duty to prevent war from ever again starting from German soil. In view of the fact that the boundary between the two German States is also the principal line of contact of the world's two most powerful military coalitions, the vital interests of the peoples require that the Governments of the two German States should resolutely come out in favour of both world-wide and regional disarmament and actively support all measures directed towards that end.

Accordingly, the Government of the German Democratic Republic has at all times supported suggestions for the establishment of a denuclearized zone in Central Europe and itself has proposed the conclusion of agreements between the Governments of the two German States on the renunciation of access to nuclear weapons in any form.

The establishment of a denuclearized zone in Central Europe, which should include the two German States, is all the more important because the Government of the West German Federal Republic is striving for a change of the status quo in Europe and calls for the seizure of the territories of other States, thus creating ever new, dangerous tension. The establishment of a denuclearized zone in Central Europe would do away with the danger of tension and explosion and create favourable prerequisites for safeguarding security in Europe. A measure of this kind would be in keeping with the proposition set forth in the memorandum of the Government of the USSR that "not only groups of States embracing whole continents or large geographical areas but also more limited groups of States and even individual countries may assume obligations to establish denuclearized zones".

At present the opposition of the West German Government to these proposals not only makes it impossible to establish a denuclearized zone in Central Europe but also hampers the establishment of denuclearized zones in Northern Europe, the Balkans, the

Mediterranean and the Danube area. The signing also by the West German Federal Republic of the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, which the German Democratic Republic has already signed, and the renunciation of nuclear weapons in any form, would remove one of the main obstacles to the establishment of a denuclearized zone in Europe extending from the North Cape to Sicily. It would open up prospects of far-reaching importance for safeguarding peace both in Europe and throughout the world. An agreement on the establishment of a denuclearized zone in Central Europe would make it easier for the non-nuclear States to obtain from the nuclear Powers guarantees that would preclude the use of nuclear weapons against the countries forming part of the denuclearized zones in Europe.

The Government of the West German Federal Republic, however, stubbornly opposes the implementation of such a plan for peace and security. It refuses to conclude treaties with the German Democratic Republic which are valid in international law because it wishes to have a free hand for acts of aggression contrary to international law. For this reason it also opposes the establishment of a denuclearized zone in Central Europe with the two German States forming part of it and is seeking for ways and means to put obstacles in the way of the implementation of the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

III.

The treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons drafted by the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament has so far been signed by approximately seventy States, including military allies of West Germany. But the West German Federal Republic delays signing the treaty. The West German Federal Chancellor, Dr. Kurt Georg Kiesinger, formulated the reasons for this approach as follows:

> "The position of the Federal Republic differs from the positions of other States in that it is necessary for us to overcome what is called the status quo. That means that to overcome the status quo is for us an obligatory task. This does not apply to other countries." (Bulletin des Presse- und Informationsamtes der Bundesregierung, Bonn, 18 July, 1968)

Thus the West German Federal Republic dissociates itself from the policies of all other States. Its policy differs from the policies of other States in that it is the only State in Europe which does not recognize the territorial status quo and

wants to change it, by force, if necessary. Hence its striving to secure the right to have control over nuclear weapons and its opposition to the nuclear non-proliferation treaty.

The Government of the West German Federal Republic tries to cover up its position in regard to the treaty by declaring that it renounced nuclear weapons as long ago as 1954. But Federal Chancellor Kiesinger stated on 17 February 1967 that that "renunciation" referred only to "the manufacture of nuclear weapons in our own territory". He added:

> "This new treaty ..... renounces much more, that is, the rather theoretical case, in which nuclear weapons are manufactured in the territories of other countries or jointly with these other countries or with that other country; it also renounces the receiving of nuclear weapons which an existing nuclear Power would be prepared to transfer to us, and it is impossible not to see that, from the legal standpoint, the obligation goes much further ..." (Bulletin des Presse- und Informationsantes der Bundesregierung, Bonn, 21 February 1967)

That means that the Government of the West German Federal Republic has never really renounced nuclear weapons and even today does not want to do so, but seeks access to nuclear weapons and is preparing for their manufacture by itself or in conjunction with other countries. By these "other countries" the West German Government means above all the Republic of South Africa and Israel, that is, States with which it has already been co-operating in the nuclear field for a number of years.

The West German Federal Republic's opposition to the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons is especially directed against the treaty's provisions on the control of fissionable material. The treaty provides for a uniform and universal control in accordance with the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and its safeguards system. This system has already been put to the test and its effectiveness has been proved. It is applied by a great number of States to the complete satisfaction of the parties.

The West German Federal Republic, however, wants to avoid this uniform international control which is exercised by the United Nations. It insists on control being exercised in the Federal Republic by the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM). EURATOM, however, is nothing but an exclusive group consisting of six NATO States among which the West German Federal Republic is striving for

leadership. Control by EURATOM would amount to nothing but self-control by the Federal Republic and the preclusion of a genuine and trustworthy international control.

This position of the Government of the West German Federal Republic enables the conclusion to be drawn that it intends to continue its preparations - which are already in an advanced stage - for its own manufacture of nuclear weapons, without including in this process genuine and effective control.

The Government of the West German Federal Republic also regards the creation of a so-called "European nuclear force" as a further stage on the way to gaining access to nuclear weapons. West German Federal Chancellor Kiesinger stated in this connexion:

> "For me the most interesting aspect of the non-proliferation treaty has always been the European one ... I believe that a united Europe must be in a position to do for its defence what is necessary for a formation of that kind, that is, it must be free also to decide about its armament." (Bulletin des Presse- und Informationsamtes der Bundesregierung, Bonn, 18 July 1968)

The West German Government bases itself on the argument that a Western European nuclear force would enable the Federal Republic to pursue its aggressive aims in regard to changing the territorial status quo and the frontiers in Europe.

Moreover, the Government of the West German Federal Republic tries to justify its opposition to the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons also by asserting the need for "enhanced security". But nobody threatens the security of the Federal Republic. The threat to the peoples of Europe comes exclusively from the Federal Republic and its striving for control over nuclear weapons. The security of the peoples of Europe requires the renunciation by the two German States of access to nuclear weapons in any form.

The Government of the German Democratic Republic, which is always guided by the idea that it is the moral and legal duty of the two German States to make special efforts in the field of disarmament and the restriction of the arms race, renews and confirms its proposals that

- the Government of the West German Federal Republic should abandon its opposition to the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and sign the treaty without delay and without reservations;

- the two German States should join a denuclearized zone in Central Europe; and

- the Governments of the two German States should actively support the proposals - now before the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament - on some urgent measures for stopping the arms race and for disarmament.

The Government of the German Democratic Republic assures the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament of its readiness to participate, as far as it is able, in the accomplishment of these aims and justify to the full its responsibilities towards the German nation and the peoples of the world.